Doing more with less was the mantra of the 1990s. Business cut back on the number of (lower and middle-level) employees. The U.S. military was downsized. Universities reduced the hiring of tenure-track faculty and began to rely increasingly on outside contract instructors (whose compensation is often less than that of a graduate assistant for the same work). And germane to the topic of stepped care, managed care has markedly reduced the number of sessions covered for psychotherapy services as well as the compensation that practitioners can expect for a given amount of professional effort (Kent & Hersen, 2000) .
One argument is that, like physicians and other medical practitioners, we mental health professionals had it coming. For too long, some contend, we have been able to continue raising our fees and extending with little restraint the numbers of sessions billed to our patients or their insurance companies, and we have sometimes done so with interventions and assessments lacking in empirical support. On the other hand, as suggested by several of the articles to be discussed here, cutting back in this way .and trying to conform to a managed care formula may result not only in vitiating our ability to meet our responsibilities to our patients but may also end up costing more in terms of actual monies spent by peopleand their insurance carriers-and lead to limited positive impact on the personal, social, and occupational functioning of our patients.
Sometimes one can do more with less-"more" at least in the sense that we can serve more people because of less time devoted to each one. Sometimes we do less with more. Sometimes we end up doing much less with less. And sometimes having less time to work with patients ends up costing more in the long run. These are the conundrums and challenges posed by stepped care, which refers to the practice of beginning one's therapeutic efforts with the least expensive and least intrusive intervention possible and moving on to more expensive and/or more intrusive interventions Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gerald C. Davison, Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1061. Electronic mail may be sent to gdaviso («>rcf .usc.edu. only if deemed necessary in order to achieve a desired therapeutic goal.
I have extracted and constructed a number of themes from the four articles in this special series on stepped care in this journal (Newman, 2000; Otto, Pollack, & Maki, 2000; Sobell & Sobell, 2000; Wilson, Vitousek, & Loeb, 2000) in an effort to comment in ways that may lead to an elaboration of the worthwhile questions raised by these authors. As argued elsewhere in a critique of RCTs (see Goldfried & Davison, 1994, p. 292) , assigning RCT participants to treatment groups on the basis of a DSM diagnosis discourages, if not makes impossible, the kind of idiographic functional analysis that is the lifeblood of responsible clinical practice as well as of sound experimental research. Newman (2000) discusses this well and reviews some research that she is involved in that, for example, applies functional analysis and tailored intervention to treatment failures from RCTs-especially failures in experimental conditions that, on average, effect statistically and even clinically significant improvements. Another way to appreciate the importance of this research strategy is to look at it as studying the variance that is unexplained in RCTs. I agree fully with Newman that it is the DSM focus that has created the problem, and she proposes constructive strategies for complementing the now-familiar RCT research paradigm with studies that permit functional analysis of individual cases and flexible utilization of therapy techniques rather than adherence to a treatment manual applied to heterogeneous research participants who are regarded as homogeneous per a DSM diagnosis.
In this context, however, it is important to note what Calhoun, Moras, Pilkonis, and Rehm (1998) referred to as a second generation of treatment manuals, which emphasize strategies more than the strict application of specific techniques. Calhoun et al. cited Linehan's (1993) widely used dialectical behavior therapy for people with borderline personality disorder, "who present invariably with multiple, pressing problems.... She [Linehan] provide[s] hierarchies of problems, sequential strategies for treating them, and a mix of specific tactics within strategies, and it is unlikely that the treatment of any two patients will be identical, although both treatments will be recognizable as dialectical behavior therapy [italics added)" (Calhoun et al., 1998, p. 154) . More explicit use of therapy manuals as strategic tools rather than formulaic prescriptions can reduce the danger of. as Goldftied and Wolfe (1996) cautioned, manuals being used "as more of a straightjacket than a set of guidelines" (p. 1014).
One of the questions raised by practitioners is whether RCTs are relevant to the challenges they face (see, e.g., the debate in Persons & Silberschatz, 1998 ; see also Seligman's, 1995 , report of the Consumer Reports survey and the critique by Jacobson & Christensen, 1996) . In my view, those who dismiss the relevance of RCTs to the everyday work of clinicians are no more correct than are researchers who focus all their evidentiary efforts on group studies without taking as seriously the "error variance" in the outcomes of all RCTs (more on variances within groups below).
Going back to the data from an RCT and looking more idiographically at the nonresponders, as Newman and her associates are doing, is a welcome enhancement to our efforts to understand therapeutic change. It is also consistent with idiographic applications of nomothetic principles as articulated by a number of authors (e.g., Eifert, Evans, & McKendrick, 1990; Lazarus & Davison, 1971; Persons, 1989) . Sobell and Sobell (2000) also deal with this issue in their discussion of what has come to be called aptitude neatment interaction (ATI), the matching of particular kinds of patients with putatively appropriate treatments. In discussing Project MATCH (Allen et al., 1999) , they remind us of the failure to show much in the way of ATI-in the MATCH case, the matching variables included motivation to abstain and psychiatric comorbidity-and suggest that, in general, the problems finding ATIs might lie at least in part with the use of the DSM to categorize participants and then randomly assign them to treatment conditions. The question is The close-up, idiographic approach that all the authors advocate as a complement to RCTs is consistent with an important and seldom-discussed limitation of RCTs that Lazarus and I have noted (Davison & Lazarus, 1995) . Consider one of the simplest type of therapy study, involving an experimental group and some sort of attention-placebo control group. We have become accustomed over the years to expect some degree of improvement in placebo groups, sometimes even to the degree that within-condition changes are significant (recall, e.g., Paul's, 1966 , classic study on desensitization). The researcher, of course, hopes that any such improvement will, on average, be exceeded by positive changes in the experimental condition.
But consider the following situation, which is probably not infrequent. Participant A in the experimental group improves significantly, and Participant B in the placebo control group improves to the same degree. Can we with confidence attribute the improvement of Participant A to a particular feature of the experimental condition? Another way to put the question is as follows: Given that Participant A improved in the experimental condition, can we say he would not have improved to the same degree if he had been randomly assigned to the control condition (for Participant B showed the same improvement, and it is common to find some degree of improvement even in placebo conditions)? Furthermore, because placebo elements are admittedly a part of the experimental condition-hence the inclusion of a placebo control group-can we say with confidence that Participant A's improvement was not due to the placebo elements inherent in the experimental condition? I suggest that the answers to these questions is "no."
Reports of comparative outcome research imply, if not assert outright, that improvements in experimental participants are due to something particular about that condition vis-a-vis a control group, even though there is always variance in change scores in both groups. But recall the caution issued many years ago by Bergin (1966 Bergin ( , 1970 that there is usually some deterioration among some participants in experimental conditions, even when the group, on average, improves significantly with respect (o pretreatment status and more than control conditions. How frequently do authors attribute this worsening to something special about the experimental condition? (See also Haaga & Stiles, 2000 , for a discussion of the need for post hoc analyses of such variability in response to treatment conditions.)
The Self-Correcting Nature of Stepped Care
The Sobell and Sobell (2000) article nicely demonstrates that an inherent feature and advantage of stepped care is that it selfcorrects; that is, it forces one to monitor constantly the effects of one's interventions and to adjust subsequent strategies based on what has just happened. This sounds reasonable enough. It is, however, not the way that many practitioners have operated, at least until recently.
To give an example, when I was on my internship at a Veterans Affairs hospital 35 years ago, I served for half a year as ward psychologist. When a new patient came onto the ward, I, of course, would read his file, especially the just-conducted intake report. 1 was struck by the modal answer of the intake worker to the question regarding treatment recommendations. It was almost always something like "antipsychotics" and/or "psychotherapy." And given the separation of the assessment-intake operation from what happened to the patient on the ward, it was unclear to me what guidance the intake report really provided to the treatment team. And most certainly the predictive validity or utility of the intake-based treatment recommendation was seldom if ever checked even informally. Not to put too fine an edge on it, but the people doing the intakes seldom followed up on what happened to the patients once a treatment disposition was made. And the contents of the intake report were of limited use (to put it charitably) in deciding how to treat the patient.
As has been noted for many years (e.g., Mischel, 1968) , this is not a good model for mental health care-it is neither effective nor efficient. I happened to learn a different way of doing things from Walter Mischel, Albert Bandura, and Arnold Lazarus during my graduate studies. In their own ways they taught that assessment should be inextricably tied to intervention, that assessment is not synonymous with diagnosis, that assessment never stops, and that assessment should be an intrinsic part of intervention in that it provides continuing feedback to therapists about the progress of treatment and about the need to make adjustments as one proceeds. Sobell and Sobell (2000, p. 574 ) provide a figure depicting the nature of stepped care. I believe that the figure should be a bit more complex by including within the treatment boxes an explicit acknowledgment that treatments themselves are highly complex affairs and that feedback-based adjustments are made on a sessionby-session-indeed, on a moment-to-moment-basis. To take another example from my own clinical and research experience, when one conducts systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 1958) , the patient's progress up the anxiety hierarchy is tied to his or her mastery of anxiety at lower levels of aversiveness. In other words, the treatment itself is made up of many small procedural steps, each of which depends on what has happened at the previous step. I know that getting this molecular runs the risk of getting outside the boundary conditions of what is meant by stepped care, but I believe the example is apt.
The Relationship Between Stepped Care and Empirically Supported Treatments
In their discussion of Project MATCH and of the treatment of alcohol problems generally, Sobell and Sobell (2000) empha-1 Two points are worth noting. First, these domains of the person's life would not as readily go unnoticed if Axis V of the DSM, Global Assessment of Functioning, were routinely used. Second, 1 believe that deterioration effects in these nonsymptomatic domains would also be worth tracking.
size that, whenever possible, the treatment used should enjoy some empirical support. But they indicate also that "stepped care ... adds the guideline that decisions to change treatments should be performance based" (Sobell & Sobell, 2000, p. 578) .
The implications of this comment are considerable and need to be drawn out. A given intervention may enjoy little if any empirical support (from RCTs), and yet, in a particular ideographic context, it may show a positive effect. Such an (interim) outcome can and should inform the clinician in his or her future decision making on behalf of the patient. For a particular patient at a particular time, a nonvalidated intervention may have a positive effect. This is a datum. It makes no sense to disregard it because that intervention lacks empirical support in RCTs. When one is operating with a stepped care cognitive schema, these individual, unique effects provide information on how far one has come and perhaps also how far one needs to go with the patient and how one might try to get there. To which I say "Bravo" but also "Be careful out there." The caution lies at the heart of the nature of our field as a science and an art, and it goes way back to the very beginnings of our field (e.g., Meehl, 1954) . Lazarus and 1 have recently referred to this as "the dialectics of science and practice" (Davison & Lazarus, 1995) . That part of our argument of relevance here is that clinical psychology and the other helping professions (and sciences!) face no greater challenge and enjoy no greater an opportunity than to deal with the necessary and potentially constructive dialectical tension between controlled findings and empirically supported principles, on the one hand, and the art of clinical practice, on the other hand. Under the best of circumstances, the behavior of clinicians is informed by empirically based knowledge, but specific interventions with individual clinical cases always require going beyond what the science tells us. Empirically based decision making is always informed by the particularities of an individual case, and clinical judgment-the art of clinical work-is required to implement a general principle.
Least Restrictive Alternative
It is useful to make explicit the connection between stepped care and the legal principle of least restrictive alternative. The latter concept is germane to issues of institutionalization. In general terms, mental health professionals are, under certain circumstances, legally required to provide that treatment which restricts the patient's liberty to the least possible degree while remaining workable and effective (In Re: Tarpley, 1991) . It is, for example, unconstitutional to confine a nondangerous mentally ill patient who is capable of surviving on his or her own or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends (Project Release v. Prevost, 1983 ). More generally, as pointed-out by Sobell and Sobell (2000) , treatment should entail as little intrusion as possible. The link to stepped care is that the most intrusive/intensive/expensive interventions should be implemented only when less intrusive ones have failed or, in light of the evidence, are unlikely to serve the patient's best interests (e.g., by being ineffective and thereby prolonging distress). What stepped care does is make explicit the professional and perhaps also the moral applicability of the least restrictive alternative principle to noninstitutional treatment settings.
The Costs of Ineffective Low-Intensity Interventions Wilson et al. (2000) rightly caution that "failure to respond to an initial low-intensity level of care [could] discourage patients from seeking subsequent treatment or undermine their response to such treatment" (p. 554). Thus, there are risks associated with beginning with low-intensity treatments across the board. It is better-as these authors understand-to construct the steps according to a judgment of the minimally intensive/intrusive treatment that a given patient is likely to respond favorably to. This is not to say that the experimental literature always provides sure guidelines (for the most part, it does not), but the caveat is well made.
And it is related to an issue that is not acknowledged sufficiently, namely, the consequences of patients getting worse from ineffective treatments. I have discussed this in the context of the ethics of offering sexual conversion treatment to gay men and lesbians:
There may be one sense in which efficacy relates to the ethical issues.
If an ineffective reorientation therapy is undertaken, the patient is going to be disappointed and likely therefore to feel even worse about his predicament-he has not only failed to achieve the reorientation goal but comes away continuing to believe that his homosexuality is bad and sick and perhaps feeling even worse about being gay. (Davison, 1991, p. 148) Thus, not only do ineffective treatments not bring about desired change (by definition), they may also have a negative impact on the patient's self-esteem and reduce his or her motivation to continue trying to change. The Challenge of Briefer and Less Expensive Treatments Wilson et al. (2000) comment that very few patients with bulimia avail themselves of the best empirically supported treatments, CBT and Weissman and Klerman's interpersonal therapy (Weissman, 1995) . Given that these treatments require specialized training and given the shortage of such training, they conclude that "briefer and simpler" (Wilson et al., 2000, p. 564) treatments are called for. Their review of serf-help strategies gives reason to be optimistic that, as research finds its way into such widely disseminable sources as self-help books, less expensive and more widely available treatments for bulimia may provide benefits to greater numbers of people than is now the case.
The problem, however, is that all manner of self-help books and tapes are sold aggressively in mass market outlets, and the value of such nonprofessional modes of intervention is widely (or wildly) variable (Rosen, 1987) . Again, the consequences of a failed change effort are likely to be far more negative than merely no change; the person is likely to come away from such experiences with an impaired sense of self-efficacy vis-a-vis the problem he or she is seeking remediation of. Moreover, the time spent not improving from an ineffective treatment-whether it be inexpensive, unobtrusive, or both-is time that could have been devoted to a more appropriate intervention, albeit a more "stepped-up" one. Like any other intervention, a self-help manual will be no more effective than the utility and appropriateness of both the underlying principles and the power of the procedures to effect desired change.
The Costs of Ineffective and Effective
Psychotropic Drug Therapy Otto et al. (2000) point out that the dropout rates for drug treatment of panic disorder are considerably higher than those for CBT. Moreover, as is the case with most psychotropics, relapse is the rule when drugs are withdrawn-patients either get worse or have to remain on the drugs indefinitely for there to be any chance at all of maintaining whatever improvement the drugs have resulted in. If they do the latter, there are costs associated with long-term physical damage as well as personal, financial, and societal costs. If they stop taking the drug and relapse, their lives and those of others continue to be negatively affected by limitations in their effectiveness as social beings and by the cascading negative effects of their anxieties in the form of personal unhappiness and lower quality relationships with others. Thus, from the perspective of cost-effectiveness, even though pharmacotherapy may at first require fewer therapist contacts and appears (clearly to managed care companies) to be the least expensive treatment consistent with at least a modicum of effectiveness, people dropping out of it continue to have their lives interfered with by their anxieties, and as Newman (2000) points out, there are major costs associated with such problematic outcomes.
Furthermore, the study reported by Otto et al. (2000) at their specialty anxiety disorders clinic provides evidence dispelling the widely held assumption that drug treatment for psychological disorders is less expensive in dollar terms than CBT, whether CBT is administered individually or in groups. Quite the contrary, the per-patient costs are considerably lower for empirically supported psychosocial treatment, and the short-and long-term outcomes are at least as good as what people derive from various psychotropics. And other research reviewed by Otto et al., including the recently completed multicenter trial (Barlow, Gorman, Shear, & Woods, 1997 , as cited in Otto et al., 2000 , gives no support, regardless of cost, for combining CBT with drugs. Such a combination, of course, adds considerably to cost and intrusiveness and is therefore difficult to justify within the stepped care framework.
Concluding Comment
One common theme in these articles reflects a core controversy in contemporary mental health care, namely, how clinicians justify the use of particular assessment and intervention procedures. The reports from the Division 12 Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures (e.g., Chambless et al., 1996) are as bothersome and meaningless to some as they are invigorating and, well, validating to others. The matter is not an easy one to resolve, but inherent to any rational discussion of stepped care is the assumption that the clinician has a basis other than personal preference for how particular interventions are rank ordered in terms of cost and intrusiveness. hi other words, stepped care has to be regarded within the context of some kind of consensus as to what treatments are effective. It is no accident that all the articles I have discussed here entail careful reviews of the efficacy and/or effectiveness of treatments for particular disorders.
However this controversy is resolved (or debated, because I doubt it will be resolved), the fact is that the concept of stepped care has meaning only to the degree that the levels of intervention available for selection be judged as likely to benefit the particular patient one is working with at a given place and time. Idiographic considerations are inevitable; indeed, they would seem to be professionally required (cf. Fishman, 1999; Persons, 1989 ). As noted above, the continuing monitoring of interventions beginning with the least expensive and least restrictive promises to provide an essential guide to both clinician and patient as to whether the treatment being implemented is worth staying with-worth the money and the effort relative to the impact it is having on the problem for which the patient has contracted with the clinician for assistance.
Managed care has doubtless been a factor in the growing interest in stepped care and all that it implies. We do not, however, have to embrace current models and practices of managed care to appreciate the ethical imperatives inherent to stepped care: Clinicians should intrude as little as possible into the lives of their patients while at the same time providing the maximum clinical benefits. These goals are to be achieved by clinicians learning and practicing the best that the science can offer and by carefully and continually monitoring during treatment the changes shown by the patient in those psychological domains thai there is joint agreement on as foci for intervention.
